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FOREWORD
“MAY IT PLEASE THE COURT”
The Honorable Edward C. Stringer†
A sense of epoch proportion begins to settle in to the process
of opinion drafting in the Supreme Court due, in no small part, to
the reality that between the parties who have been litigating for so
long and who have so much at stake, it is the final word. There is
no place to go from here, as in only rare instances is review granted
by the U.S. Supreme Court. The court feels this weighty
responsibility, as well as the responsibility that we are setting the
course of the law perhaps for generations to come.
Crafting the opinion begins to feel like how an artist or a
composer must feel in approaching a new creation—that it must
clearly and fully express the point being made without saying too
much, that the parts must interrelate and that it must have
enduring meaning. It begins as a concept in the minds of the
justices when we grant the petition for further review not knowing
what the end result will be, and evolves through the briefs, the
court’s internal bench memo, oral arguments, conference, opinion
drafting, and finally, the decision. Before the opinion is filed each
member of the court has the opportunity to review it from different
points of view to see if its main premise works to resolve the
dispute, and if it meets the needs of the trial court, practicing
attorneys and members of the public impacted by it. When it does,
it is filed and emerges into the sunlight to take its own life.
The court never comments on the process of reaching the
final result, or on the opinion itself—it is an ironclad rule that the
opinion speaks for itself. But many others should and do
comment. Practicing attorneys, academics, policymakers and
members of the public having an interest in an opinion of the
court frequently express their views on court decisions. As creators
† Justice Stringer retired from the Minnesota Supreme Court on August 31,
2002, after eight years of distinguished service.
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of this new work of art, we hope that it will be universally and
eternally admired, but we are not so naïve as to believe that critique
will always be in the spirit of the traditional judicial salutation “may
it please the court.” We know it won’t always please the court, but
thoughtful critical comment—comment that goes beyond the mere
grumping about an unsuccessful appeal—is expected, needed, and
welcomed. It tests the resilience of the rule of law to changing
circumstances and probes the boundaries of its application. It is
helpful to the practitioner in advising clients and in advocating
before the courts, and is a rich resource for the trial courts in
rulings in other cases. For the court, it may be a mirror in which to
view the opinion from new and interesting perspectives.
Most often there is some kind of precedent for the court’s
ruling, and an opinion of the court based on prior case law that a
critic might consider out of date or an inappropriate rule of law for
the specific case raises particularly complex issues because stare
decisis is a weighty principal of appellate review. While stare decisis
appropriately venerates stability and predictability in the law, the
rub is that the rule of law is ever alive and always evolving. As Mr.
Justice Frankfurter wrote in his dissenting opinion in United States v.
International Boxing Club: Stare decisis “is not, to be sure, an
imprisonment of reason. But neither is it a whimsy. . . .[I]f stare
decisis be one aspect of law, as it is, to disregard it in identic
1
situations is mere caprice.” The evolution of the law must carefully
thread its way along this ephemeral path between imprisonment
and whimsy, and courts should proceed with great caution. Critical
commentary is helpful along the journey.
So it is in this vein that I extend our gratitude to the William
Mitchell Law Review for undertaking review of many significant
rulings of the Supreme Court in our 2001-2002 term. It is a service
to the practitioners and to the courts—and whether or not “it may
please the court,” it is welcome. We also extend our gratitude to
Professor Peter Knapp who fearlessly yet perennially reviews
selected appellate court opinions at the Annual Conference of
Judges in December with thoughtful, well-balanced comment
sufficiently witty to hold the attention of a tough crowd—he draws
a full house.
Thanks and congratulations.
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348 U.S. 236, 249 (1955) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
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